Plaintiff landowner sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)[2] and the Quiet Title Act,[3] alleging that BLM failed to give proper notice of a planned conveyance of adjacent property, thereby denying the plaintiff due process of law. The district court found that the Plaintiff's challenge was time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run when the agency published notice of the proposed land transfer in the Federal Register. Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that publication of notice in the Federal Register was insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations because BLM had a duty to give personal notice of the proposed transfer to the plaintiff's predecessor in interest.

Through his predecessor in interest, Camp claimed a right of way to a water source on land adjoining his property. The original 1977 right of way, granted to Camp's predecessor in interest (his uncle), was to run for a twenty-year period. In 1987, BLM conveyed the adjoining property to the Nature Conservancy, which in turn conveyed the property to defendant Indian Hill Limited Partnership. Each party took the property subject to the right of way. BLM gave public notice of the proposed conveyance in 1987 by publication in the Federal Register and two local newspapers. BLM did not personally notify Camp's predecessor in interest, despite the then-applicable regulation that required such notice to adjoining landowners.[4]

When the right of way expired in 1997, Indian Hill refused to renew it on the same terms, and Camp brought suit. Camp contended that had the adjacent property remained in BLM's possession, the right of way would almost certainly have been renewed, because the agency's regulations stated that it must renew the grant as long as it was still being used for the same purposes.[5] The plaintiff also argued that if he or his predecessor in interest had received notice of the proposed conveyance, they could and would have taken a variety of steps to protect their interests.

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by citing to the statutory provision regarding notice in the Federal Register, which states that publication in the Federal Register is valid as notice "except in cases where notice by publication is insufficient in law."[6] Finding little authority applying or considering that statutory exception, the court held that the plain language of the statute clearly indicated that BLM had a legal duty to personally notify adjacent landowners. Thus, publication of the proposed conveyance in the Federal Register did not start the statute of limitations running on Camp's claims.

The court found that the case that BLM cited was inapplicable. In Friends of Sierra Railroad, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,[7] the Ninth Circuit concluded that personal notice was not required.[8] However, that case made no suggestion of any independent legal duty to give notice by a means other than publication. Likewise, in Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States,[9] the court held that a mining company's challenges to certain BLM actions were barred by the statute of limitations because BLM had given notice in the Federal Register.[10] Again, that case did not suggest that BLM had an independent duty to inform the mining company by any means other than publication.

In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff's cause of action was not time barred because BLM had an obligation to personally notify the plaintiff that the agency intended to convey federal property adjacent to the plaintiff's property. The court explained that notice in the Federal Register was inadequate because NEPA required personal notice.