Alaskan native villages (Quinhagak plaintiffs) sued Alaska and the United States to enforce their fishing rights under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).[1] Finding that the Quinhagak plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, the district court awarded attorney fees for the litigation stages but not the administrative stages of the suit. Alaska appealed the award, and the Quinhagak plaintiffs cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees for the administrative stages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of litigation fees, but reversed and remanded for consideration of a fee award for the administrative stage.

Litigation over Alaskan native subsistence fishing rights had been ongoing for twelve years. Two key issues at stake were whether navigable and federally reserved waters in Alaska are managed under ANILCA (the "where" issue), and whether the state or federal government had jurisdiction over the waters (the "who" issue). The federal court combined two major cases involved in the controversy, Katie John v. United States[2] and Alaska v. Babbitt [3] (collectively Katie John/Babbitt), staying all other proceedings until the core issues were resolved in the combined case. The Quinhagak plaintiffs sued for declaratory judgment concerning their fishing rights, and their action was stayed along with the other cases awaiting the resolution of the core issues in Katie John/Babbitt. The Quinhagak plaintiffs also joined the other parties in filing amicus briefs in Katie John/Babbitt. After the district court in Katie John/Babbitt found that ANILCA applied to all navigable waters in Alaska and confirmed federal management authority, the district court in the instant case ruled in favor of the Quinhagak plaintiffs, who then filed for attorney fees under ANILCA.[4] The district court found that the Quinhagak plaintiffs were prevailing parties, and therefore could recover attorney fees for the litigation phase, but not for the administrative phases because ANILCA did not authorize fees for these phases.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Quinhagak plaintiffs were eligible for attorney fees under ANILCA. On appeal, the state argued that the Quinhagak plaintiffs did not raise the "who" issue in their case and thus should not receive attorney fees for work on this issue in Katie John/Babbitt. The court disagreed, citing three reasons. First, during the preliminary injunction hearing the State recognized that the federal jurisdiction issue related to the Quinhagak case. Second, both courts found the issue central to the present case because it relied on Title VIII subsistence rights which would not apply if the State had jurisdiction. Finally, the Quinhagak plaintiffs were invited by the court to file, and did file, briefs in the Katie John/Babbitt case. Based on their participation in Katie John/Babbitt and the centrality of the "who" issue to determination of their case, the Quinhagak plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney fees for their work in Katie John/Babbitt.

On cross-appeal, the Quinhagak plaintiffs challenged the denial of attorney fees for the administrative stages of the case. While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that ANILCA does not expressly award attorney fees for required administrative proceedings, the court found that it also did not expressly deny fees. The language of ANILCA awards attorney fees to prevailing parties in an "action."[5] Relying on the analogous issue decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to the Clean Air Act[6] in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,[7] the court determined that the language of the act should be read broadly, so as to permit costs and fees for the administrative phases, regardless of the timing. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning, if the administrative work was "ordinarily necessary" to the action, the court had discretion to award such costs.[8] In considering ANILCA, the Ninth Circuit determined that Congress clearly expressed its goal to protect native fishing rights and its intention that administrative proceedings assist natives in maintaining those rights.[9] Applying the rule in Pennsylvania, the Ninth Circuit concluded that administrative phases are ordinarily necessary to action under ANILCA and thus the district court had discretion to award fees for those phases of the action. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine what attorney fees for administrative proceedings the Quinhagak plaintiffs were entitled to under this broad reading of ANILCA.