This case involved two authorized timber sales in the Boise National Forest: the Lightning Ridge and the Long Prong timber sales. Plaintiffs claimed that in authorizing the sales, the United States Forest Service (USFS) violated the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)[1] and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).[2] Plaintiffs sought an injunction to stop logging associated with the timber sales. The district court held that Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. and Alliance for the Wild Rockies (collectively ISC) failed to exhaust their administrative remedies for some of their claims. In addition, the district court held that some of ISC's claims were barred by claim preclusion, and the remainder failed on the merits. In rejecting the majority of the district court's holding, the Ninth Circuit held that ISC's claims were not barred by claim preclusion and that ISC had not failed to exhaust its administrative remedies for all of its claims.

The court explained that NFMA requires USFS to develop forest plans,[3] which must comply with NFMA. In 1990, USFS completed a Land and Resource Management Plan (Plan) for the Boise National Forest. The Plan utilized a proxy-on-proxy approach to comply with NFMA's requirement that "'wildlife habitat . . . be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area.'"[4] The court explained that in using the proxy-on-proxy approach, USFS selected an indicator species and then designated an amount of habitat necessary to maintain the population of that indicator species rather than monitoring the entire population to evaluate its continued viability. USFS then monitored the habitat of the indicator species for population changes. In USFS's 1990 Plan, the pileated woodpecker (Dryocopus pileatus) was selected as an indicator species. USFS determined that to maintain the species's viability, each pair of breeding woodpeckers needed three hundred acres of timber with one hundred acres of that being old growth. USFS also determined that there were approximately 90 pairs of breeding woodpeckers and therefore 27,000 acres of timber needed to be designated as woodpecker habitat. To accomplish this goal the 1990 Plan required 55,000 acres of timber to be designated as woodpecker habitat and required that new acres be allocated for any "'significant' areas of old growth . . . lost to fire."[5]

The Ninth Circuit first addressed whether ISC's claims were barred because of claim preclusion. The court found that although ISC made almost identical arguments in prior challenges to timber sales within the Boise National Forest, its claims were not barred by claim preclusion in its challenge of the Lightning Ridge and Long Prong timber sales. The court reasoned that these were different sales from the previously challenged sales and that these sales had facts and issues different from the previous sales.

The court next addressed the issue of administrative remedy exhaustion. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)[6] requires a plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies before bringing a challenge in federal court.[7] The Ninth Circuit reviewed the two claims that the district court dismissed and were still at issue in this case. First, the court considered ISC's claim that USFS failed to divulge whether it had developed a habitat conservation plan (HCP) for the sensitive species at issue. Next, the court considered ISC's claim that USFS neglected to determine the population or monitor the "'old-growth dependent Management Indicator Species.'"[8] On the first claim concerning the HCP, the court found that ISC did not make any mention of the claim when the issue was before USFS; thus, the court held that because USFS had no notice of the claim, the claim had not been exhausted. On the second claim, the Ninth Circuit found that ISC had "clearly expressed concern"[9] that the timber sales would harm the indicator species. Therefore, the court overturned the district court's denial of judicial review of the second claim.

In regard to ISC's NMFA claims, ISC argued that the old growth species viability standard was invalid and that it was not being met by USFS. ISC contended that the standard was invalid because assumptions made in developing the Plan were inaccurate. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that a 1996 Monitoring Report required to assess the Plan stated that changed conditions and new scientific information resulted in the Plan being insufficient. The court explained that the report included information concluding that "'the sustainability of old growth habitat "dedicated" in the Forest Plan appear[s] inadequate.'"[10] In addition, the report indicated that the standard was not being met because wildfires had destroyed timber, that timber thought to be old growth did not meet the definition of old growth in the Plan, and that other timber areas were at high risk of fire. Therefore, as the court explained, the report concluded that forty percent of the compartments[11] did not meet the standard.

ISC also argued that USFS failed to comply with the Plan because it did not rededicate forest after portions of the 55,000 acres set aside were destroyed by fire. USFS argued that because it did not find the loss of timber by fire significant, it was not required to allocate new timber to meet the standard. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with USFS, and found that forty percent noncompliance was significant.

The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the standard was invalid and that USFS failed to comply with the standard. In doing so, the court considered additional evidence that many of the initial dedications of old growth never contained old growth timber. For example, in Management Area 35, where the Lightning Ridge timber sale was located, USFS was required to dedicate 1,280 acres of old growth. However, the environmental assessment for the Lightning Ridge sale determined that no old growth existed within Management Area 35.

In concluding its review of ISC's NFMA claims regarding the old growth viability standard, the Ninth Circuit held that the Lightning Ridge and the Long Prong timber sales were illegal. In addition, the court held that the standard was invalid and that USFS's actions did not meet the standard because USFS refused to rededicate additional timber or ensure that old growth timber was actually in the compartments. Thus, the court enjoined all logging associated with the two timber sales.

In an attempt to justify the two timber sales, USFS argued that it had applied a new definition of old growth, R4,[12] in approving the sales. USFS contended that although the new definition resulted in some harvest of old growth associated with the sales, sufficient stands of R4 old growth would remain after the sales. The Ninth Circuit rejected USFS's attempt to use a new definition of old growth because there was "no inventory of R4 old growth, and . . . no plan in place setting aside blocks of R4 old growth."[13] Thus, the court found that USFS's use of the R4 definition of old growth was not part of a forest-wide plan as required by the NFMA.

ISC also argued that USFS was required to monitor the indicator species. The ISC relied on USFS's regulations to support their argument. ISC claimed that each species "'shall be identified and selected as management indicator species'"[14] and that "'[p]opulation trends of the management indicator species [shall] be monitored.'"[15] The Ninth Circuit distinguished prior case law that accepted the proxy-on-proxy approach. For example, the court distinguished Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service,[16] where USFS's method "reasonabl[y] ensure[d] viable populations of the species at issue."[17] Here the court found that USFS's method was invalid because application of the proxy-on-proxy method resulted in no old growth in Management Area 35. In addition, the court explained that in the Lightning Ridge EA, USFS's wildlife expert considered it necessary for USFS to monitor the indicator species habitat "'independent of any old growth analysis.'"[18] The court concluded its consideration of USFS's application of the proxy-on-proxy method by holding that its use in this case was arbitrary and capricious. In dicta, the court stated that it would encourage monitoring indicator species populations.

On the NEPA claims, the Ninth Circuit held that the Long Prong timber sale EIS was arbitrary and capricious. However, the court held that the Lightning Ridge EA was adequate. The court found the Long Prong EIS invalid because the scope of the cumulative effects analysis was not large enough. The court explained that the 1996 Monitoring Report concluded that the Plan was unable to ensure viable habitat because "'the habitat needs of these species must be addressed at a landscape scale.'"[19] However, USFS analyzed the impacts to the species on a "home range" scale.[20] Therefore, the court found that USFS's analysis was arbitrary and ordered USFS to produce a new EIS or a supplemental EIS. With respect to the Lightning Ridge EA, the court found that USFS's analysis was sufficient because the EA found no adverse impacts to the species; therefore, USFS was not required to complete an analysis at a scale larger than the home range scale.

The Ninth Circuit refused to order a forest-wide injunction of logging. The court explained that it preferred to address issues on a site-by-site basis. However, because the court found ISC had demonstrated irreparable harm, it remanded the case to the district court and ordered an injunction of the Lightning Ridge and Long Prong timber sales until USFS complied with NFMA and NEPA.

The dissent argued that the Lightning Ridge sale should not be enjoined because the EA determined that the sale would not harm the habitat of the pileated woodpecker, lynx (Lynz canadensis), wolverine (Gulo gulo), fisher (Martes pennanti pacifica), boreal owl (Aegalius funereus), goshawk (Accipeter gentilis), flammulated owl (Otus flammeolus), or white-headed
woodpecker (Picoides albolartus). Therefore, according to the dissent, the sale did violate NFMA's viability requirement.