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High Sierra Hikers Association v. Blackwell
390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004)

High Sierra Hikers Association (High Sierra), a group of non-profit organizations dedicated to wilderness preservation and education, petitioned the Ninth Circuit claiming the United States Forest Service (USFS) violated provisions of the Wilderness Act[1] by issuing special use permits to commercial packstock operators operating in the John Muir and Ansel Adams Wilderness Areas. On cross appeal, USFS, as well as a group of intervening pack-stock operators (Packers), challenged the district court's holding that USFS failed to comply with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)[2] in issuing special use permits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that USFS violated the provisions of NEPA by failing to conduct a proper cumulative impact analysis. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's ruling on the substantive requirements of the Wilderness Act, holding that USFS failed to properly preserve and protect the wilderness areas pursuant to act's guidelines.

The John Muir and Ansel Adams Wilderness Areas, located in the Sierra Nevada mountain range, have historically been open to commercial packstock operators for guided trips into the wilderness. USFS, responsible for managing and distributing special use permits to these wilderness areas, proposed a revised management plan in 1997, and issued a final environmental impact statement (EIS) in August 2000. In April 2000, High Sierra filed suit against USFS, claiming that the new commercial special use permits violated the National Forest Management Act (NFMA),[3] the Wilderness Act, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[4] USFS amended and finalized its plan in April 2001, after which both sides filed supplemental briefs and filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted High Sierra's motion for summary judgment on the NEPA claim, finding that USFS needed to assess the cumulative impacts of issuing special-use permits to comply with NEPA. However, the district court awarded summary judgment to USFS for both the NFMA and Wilderness Act claims, holding that USFS had determined the necessity of packstock operations in its EIS, a decision pursuant to the authority granted to the agency under the Wilderness Act and NFMA.

As a review of an administrative agency decision, the Ninth Circuit considered the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the case from the same position as the district court. The court first considered the issue of ripeness based upon the APA standard that a plaintiff may only challenge "a specific final agency action which has an actual or immediate threatened effect."[5] The Ninth Circuit interpreted the issuance of special-use permits as a final agency action under the APA because a special use permit was a legal document authorizing a particular use. Thus, the court held that USFS's policy carried actual and immediate threats to the preservation of the Wilderness Area.

Next, the Ninth Circuit examined USFS's policy to issue multi-year and special-use permits under NEPA standards which require an EIS for all federal actions significantly effecting the environment.[6] A NEPA challenge to an agency decision is normally conducted under an arbitrary and capricious standard. However, in cases where an agency failed to prepare an environmental assessment (EA), as in the present case, the court reviews the agency action under a reasonableness standard. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, holding that USFS violated NEPA when it failed to use an EIS to assess the environmental consequences of the of multi-year, special-use permits.

The Ninth Circuit also examined USFS's renewal of special use permits without NEPA review. USFS argued that the agency's one year renewal of special-use permits constituted a categorical exclusion from NEPA requirements. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that a categorical exclusion cannot be applied in "extraordinary circumstances," including application to any permit affecting a wilderness area.[7]

The court then addressed USFS's challenge to the scope of injunctive relief issued by the district court. Specifically, USFS argued the requirement that the agency conduct an assessment of the environmental impact of packstock operations by November 5, 2005 was beyond the reviewing court's authority. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the issuance of the injunction to see whether the district court properly balanced the equities between parties and gave due regard to the public interest, a power in which the district court holds "broad latitude."[8] The Ninth Circuit upheld the issuance of injunctive relief on the basis that 1) the agency's special use permit policy would likely cause irreparable injury to sensitive portions of the wilderness area; and 2) Congress has recognized a strong public interest in protecting these areas through the passage of the Wilderness Act.

The Ninth Circuit also held that the scope of the injunction did not improperly intrude upon the agency's discretion. While USFS argued the proper remedy was a remand for the agency to schedule its own plan to comply with NEPA, the Ninth Circuit determined the district court's mandate would ensure that USFS would inject environmental concerns into its new special use permit policy, an action motivated by its past non-compliance with NEPA.

USFS made an additional challenge to the scope of the injunction by arguing the district court's orders violated the Supreme Court ruling in Kleppe v. Sierra Club.[9] USFS argued Kleppe required a court to let an agency propose an action before determining how to comply with NEPA. The Ninth Circuit distinguished this situation from Kleppe, holding that the agency had already acted by issuing special-use permits and by implementing the 2001 plan. Hence, the Ninth Circuit held the district court's injunctive relief responded to and did not precede agency action.

Packers also attacked the district court's injunction, arguing they should be completely excluded from the injunction because USFS had prepared Environmental Assessments (EAs) pertaining to the stations from which they operate. The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument on the basis that NEPA standards require an assessment of the cumulative effects of packstock operations in multiple areas, not just individualized assessments. Moreover, the court reiterated that because the special-use permits constituted a major federal action, an EA was inadequate and a full EIS was required. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the basis and scope of the district court's order that USFS conduct a cumulative impact assessment by December 2005.

Next, High Sierra challenged the district court's holding that USFS acted within its discretion in issuing special use permits and adhered to the substantive goals of the Wilderness Act to preserve and protect the wilderness character of the land.[10] Specifically, High Sierra argued that an agency must establish the number and character of commercial services that are "necessary and proper" before issuing commercial special-use permits.[11] The Ninth Circuit found this argument persuasive, stating that USFS failed to address why the extent of such packstock services was necessary in its 2001 Wilderness Plan.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Wilderness Act's allowance of commercial activities "to the extent necessary" is beholden to the overarching purpose of the Wilderness Act to preserve and protect wilderness values of the land.[12] The Ninth Circuit interpreted this evaluation of necessity to require a showing that the commercial services were "no more than necessary to achieve the goals of the Act."[13] Employing this standard the Ninth Circuit held that although USFS independently addressed 1) the types of commercial services needed, 2) the extent current permits are being used, and 3) the amount of use the land can tolerate, it failed to address these factors together in relation to the ultimate goal of preserving the wilderness character of the land and therefore approved commercial services that violated the "extent necessary" requirement.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit had to consider how much deference to grant USFS in construing the substantive requirements of the Wilderness Act that guide its policy decisions. Although the Ninth Circuit held that the intent of the Wilderness Act was ambiguous due to the conflicting responsibilities bestowed on USFS, it declined to extend Chevron[14] deference because the USFS decision to grant special use permits did not have precedential value to subsequent parties and was not acting "with the force of law."[15] The court decided to accord the USFS decision respect rather than deference, examining the reasonableness of the decision through factors such as the interpretations, thoroughness, rational validity, consistency with prior pronouncements, and the care used in reaching the decision.[16]

Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the process used by USFS in interpreting the Wilderness Act was not rational. The court held the methodology in the new management plan failed to comply with the Wilderness Act's restriction on any activity that would impair the land's use as wilderness in the future. Although USFS had documented the damage packstock overuse would bring to trailheads in the wilderness areas, it failed to take appropriate action to protect the wilderness character of the land by lowering the amount of packstock use. Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's award of summary judgment to USFS on the basis that the agency failed to adhere to its statutory responsibility.

In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings that USFS failed to adhere to NEPA's provision by not conducting an EIS. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's award of summary judgment to USFS regarding the Wilderness Act and remanded the decision to the district court to determine appropriate relief. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunctive relief fashioned by the district court, holding the injunction ensured compliance with NEPA as well as partially addressing the substantive requirements of the Wilderness Act. Finally, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court on remand to determine whether remedial relief was required for any environmental degradation resulting from the commercial activities.

 



[1] Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000).

[2] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000).

[3] National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 472a, 521b, 1600, 1611-1614 (2000) (amending Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476).

[4] 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2000).

[5] High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-94 (1990)).

[6] 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).

[7] High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 390 F.3d at 641.

[8] Id. at 641 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc. 236 F.3d 985, 999 (9th Cir. 2000)).

[9] 427 U.S. 390 (1976).

[10] Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2000).

[11] High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 390 F.3d at 646.

[12] 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5).

[13] High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 390 F.3d at 647.

[14] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of a governing statute when the terms of the statute are ambiguous).

[15] High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 390 F.3d at 647.

[16] Wilderness Society v. United States Fish & Wildlife Servs., 353 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

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