The Hells Canyon Alliance (Alliance), representing primarily motorized boaters, and the Hells Canyon Preservation Council (Council), representing non-motorized watercraft users, challenged a recreation management plan developed by the United States Forest Service for the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area. The Forest Service developed the Wild and Scenic Snake River Recreation Management Plan (Management Plan) in 1994 and implemented it in 1998. The Management Plan included a three-day period every other week throughout the primary season during which motorized watercraft were barred from the "wild" sections of the Snake River. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District of Oregon's grant of summary judgment upholding the adequacy of the Management Plan.[1]

The Management Plan was developed in response to litigation challenging the Forest Service's failure to regulate motorized watercraft on the wild and scenic portions of the Snake River.[2] In 1993, the Forest Service released a draft environmental impact statement that included eight outstandingly remarkable values (ORVs)[3] and six alternatives. In response to public comments, a seventh alternative (Alternative G) was added to the final environmental impact statement (FEIS), issued in July 1994. Alternative G included motorized use-level restrictions and a three-day bar on motorized watercraft every other week during the months of July and August, resulting in a total of twenty-four, non-motorized days for the season. In October 1994, the Forest Supervisor issued a record of decision (ROD) selecting Alternative G. However, implementation of the Management Plan was stayed pending administrative appeals. In July 1995, the Deputy Regional Forester affirmed the programmatic decision to provide a non-motorized window, but stayed implementation pending further assessment of the Management Plan's effects with respect to timing and duration of the non-motorized window.

In December 1995, the Forest Service released a draft environmental assessment (Outfitter EA) regarding the economic impact of limiting commercial use permits. The Council filed suit, claiming the Forest Service had unduly delayed implementation of the Management Plan and had failed to adequately regulate motorized watercraft.[4] In April 1996, the court denied the Council's request for a preliminary injunction against the Forest Service, but indicated that the Management Plan should be implemented by the summer of 1997.[5] The Forest Service released the final Outfitter EA, which contained three alternatives, in June 1996. In September 1996, the Forest Supervisor issued a decision notice selecting Alternative C, which modified the original non-motorized window by limiting it to twenty-one days per summer. The Management Plan was implemented in summer 1997, but implementation of the non-motorized window was delayed pending completion of a further environmental assessment (Private Lands EA). The Council again filed suit, but the district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction, ordered implementation of the non-motorized window, and dismissed the suit.[6]

In March 1998, the new Forest Supervisor announced that the Management Plan would be fully implemented in the summer of 1998. The Alliance filed suit in Idaho, objecting to the non-motorized window. The Council again filed suit in Oregon, objecting to the Management Plan on several grounds. Both cases were consolidated in the District of Oregon. The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that the record adequately supported the Management Plan.[7]

The Council made the following three arguments on appeal: 1) the Forest Service's motorized use restrictions are incompatible with the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA)[8] and the Hells Canyon Act[9]; 2) the Management Plan violated the Land Resources Management Plan for the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest (Forest Plan) because the Management Plan allowed activities that degrade primitive and semi-primitive areas that existed when the river was designated as wild and scenic in 1975; and 3) the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)[10] by failing to include an alternative that set motorized use at 1970s levels.

The Ninth Circuit first determined that the Management Plan was compatible with the WSRA and the Hells Canyon Act. The WSRA requires that a wild and scenic river corridor be managed to "protect and enhance" the ORVs for which the river was designated.[11] However, "only those uses that . . . 'substantially interfere' with enjoyment and use of the values at issue--the values identified in the FEIS--are to be limited."[12] The court gave substantial deference to the Forest Service's determination as to what uses "substantially interfere" with values. According to the court, the Forest Service took the necessary "hard look" and analyzed each alternative's ability to achieve desired recreational experiences, which required a balancing of conservation and recreational objectives. The Forest Service determined that although motor watercraft use does result in some decline in scenic values, it is not a substantial interference. Further, the Hells Canyon Act specifically recognizes motorized watercraft use as a "valid use" of the river.[13] The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service's decision that its motorized craft use restriction is compatible with the WSRA and the Hells Canyon Act was not arbitrary or capricious.

Second, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that the Management Plan does not comply with the Forest Plan. The Forest Plan states that for the Snake River area, its "primary emphasis is on maintaining the recreation experiences available at the time the area was established."[14] The Council argued that the Management Plan violates this directive because it allows for degradation of primitive and semi-primitive areas that existed in 1975. However, the Ninth Circuit determined that the phrase is also susceptible to an interpretation that because motorized boat use existed in 1975, that use must be maintained. Because the Forest Plan did not specify a level of motorized or non-motorized use and because the plan was equally susceptible to more than one interpretation, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Forest Service's interpretation that motorized use was allowed in primitive and semi-primitive areas.

Third, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Council's NEPA claim. The court determined that the Forest Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives and that the inclusion of 1970s levels of motorized use would have been unrealistic because the statutorily mandated objectives required balancing recreational and ecological values: "Having analyzed and rejected a higher use level (Alternative C), the Forest Service had no obligation to consider an alternative unlikely to be implemented and inconsistent with basic policy objectives for managing the area, which included a level of use acceptable to all river users."[15] The Ninth Circuit held that the seven alternatives included in the FEIS were sufficient to permit a reasoned decision, and thus, there was no NEPA violation.

The Alliance challenged the Management Plan with two main arguments: 1) the FEIS was inadequate because the analysis of the non-motorized window was unscientific and lacking in necessary data; and 2) the Outfitter EA failed to provide a reasonable range of alternatives because it excluded an alternative that would restrict motorized craft use, but would not impose a non-motorized window. With respect to the first argument, the Ninth Circuit, holding that the FEIS analysis was sufficient for making a reasonable decision, determined that "[t]he Forest Service provided a reasoned basis for its decision to select a non-motorized window--namely, the need to balance various statutory considerations, conflicts between user groups and the expressed preferences of some users for a non-motorized option."[16] The Forest Service attempted to resolve user conflict by implementing the non-motorized window and based its decision on the facts before it. The Ninth Circuit held that the FEIS narrative-style analysis, although lacking in empirical studies, did not fail the "rule of reason" and was therefore not arbitrary or capricious.

Second, the Ninth Circuit determined that the "range of alternatives" analysis was not applicable to the Outfitter EA. The Forest Service was not legally obligated to include an option that limited motorized use without a non-motorized window. The focus of the Outfitter EA was limited to measuring economic impacts on commercial outfitters and to proposing changes to the non-motorized window only as to timing and duration. Because the Forest Service provided a reasonable range of alternatives in the FEIS, "[a]bsent significant new circumstances or information, the Forest Service did not need to repeat this task once it reached the stage of conducting, on remand, the Outfitter EA."[17] Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Forest Service upholding the final Management Plan.