Bicycle Trails Council of Marin and several other nonprofit corporations representing cyclists' interests challenged National Park Service (NPS) regulations governing bicycle use on Park Service lands.[1] In the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA), the new regulations resulted in a thirty-six percent decrease in trails open to bicycle use. The district court granted summary judgment for NPS, an agency located within the Department of the Interior. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and adopted the lower court's opinion. The Ninth Circuit held valid the new regulation which prohibited all bicycle use of off-road areas in national park units unless local park superintendents designated particular trails open to bicycle use. Amending this regulation did not require an environmental assessment (EA) or an environmental impact statement (EIS). Finally, the court held that the final trail plan for the GGNRA was valid.
At issue was NPS's change in policy toward bicycle use in the National Park System. Since the 1960s, NPS applied three management designations within the park system. In areas designated as "natural" or "historical," all trails were closed to bicycle use unless specifically designated as open. In "recreational" areas, the opposite assumption applied: trails were open to bicycle use unless specifically designated closed. Amendments to the National Park Service Organic Act (Organic Act)[2] in 1970 and 1978 made clear Congress's disapproval of this management strategy. NPS interpreted the amendments as requiring it to stop managing recreational areas under less protective rules than it was using in natural and historic areas. In 1987, NPS implemented new regulations prohibiting all bicycle use in off-road areas unless local park superintendents designated particular trails open. In 1992, NPS adopted a trail plan for the GGNRA establishing which trails were open to bicycles, resulting in a closure of about thirty-six percent of the trails to bicycle use.
Plaintiffs challenged the following two agency actions: the 1987 regulation which applied generally to all Park Service lands,[3] and the development of the 1992 trail plan for the Marin Headlands section of GGNRA.[4]The 1987 regulationchanged park rules from "open unless designated closed to bicycle use" to "closed unless designated open to bicycle use" in all areas.[5] The court held that the statutory language and the legislative intent of the 1970 and 1978 amendments mandated that NPS stop managing recreation areas under less protective rules. Although the Organic Act is silent on the issue of bicycle trail access, an interpretation that the Act allows for the "closed unless designated open" approach for bicycle trail access is not contrary to the statute. The Secretary is directed to conserve the natural elements of the parks for the future and to make such rules as "he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks."[6] A park superintendent may designate routes for bicycle use only after a written determination that bicycle use is consistent with the protection of the park area's natural, scenic, and aesthetic values, safety considerations, and management objective, and that the bicycle use will not disturb wildlife or park resources.
Agency regulations will be upheld unless arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.[7] Plaintiffs claimed that the 1987 regulation was arbitrary and was not based on a permissible construction of the Organic Act. The district court held that NPS based its decision to eliminate management categories in the 1987 regulation on a permissible construction of the Organic Act, namely that recreational units could not receive less protective treatment; NPS had to manage all units of the park system with resource protection as the primary goal.
Relying on Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm,[8] the plaintiffs argued that the 1987 regulation was invalid because NPS reversed its earlier position on bicycle use in recreation areas. They argued that NPS's new interpretation of the Organic Act as expressed in the 1987 regulation was entitled to less deference because NPS previously interpreted the Organic Act to reach an opposite conclusion regarding bicycle use, and that NPS did not provide a reasoned analysis to justify its change in position. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the State Farm analogy failed. In State Farm, an agency reversed its interpretation of an unamended statute. In contrast, NPS changed its position in response to Congressional amendments to the underlying act. The court also held that this was not a case where the agency could be said to have changed its "policy." Finally, this case is distinguishable from State Farm because NPS provided the requisite analysis of its decision to amend the regulation.
The court also held that under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)[9], NPS was not required to prepare an EA or EIS when it amended regulations pertaining to bicycle use in park recreational areas to prohibit all bicycle use of off-road areas unless local park superintendents designated particular trails to be open. The closing of off-road areas to bicycle use clearly falls within the categorical exclusion relied upon by NPS--the rule could be reasonably expected to not increase public use to the extent of compromising the nature and character of area, to not introduce noncompatible uses, nor to affect adjacent landowners or land users.
The plaintiffs also challenged NPS's 1992 GGNRA trail plan.[10] NPS adopted the final plan only after a series of review and comments on draft plans and numerous GGNRA Advisory Commission meetings. The process of deciding which trails should be open or closed to bicycle use took five years, and the plaintiffs were involved at every step of the development of the plan. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)[11] and that NPS violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS.
NPS developed an EA considering four alternate trail plans, ranging from no trail access to nearly total trail access for the bicycles. A supplemental EA and finding of no significant impact were completed. NPS concluded that allowing bicycle use of trails as provided in the staff report is consistent with the protection of the natural, scenic, aesthetic values, safety considerations, and management objectives of the GGNRA. The report concluded that the plan was not a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and did not require an EIS. In December 1992, NPS adopted the Final Trail Use Designation Plan.
The plaintiffs argued that the final plan as adopted was arbitrary and capricious, alleging that NPS failed to give sufficient consideration to recreation and that NPS had no rational basis on which to determine that resource protection would be served by closing trails to bicycle use. The court held that NPS had carefully considered recreation and all other relevant criteria; the final trail plan was based on a permissible interpretation of the relevant legislation; NPS reasonably relied on evidence showing that restricting mountain bike access would serve the goal of resource protection; and NPS reasonably relied upon evidence showing that prohibiting bicycle use of certain trails would reduce user conflict and enhance visitor safety.
Finally, the court held that the closing of certain trails to cyclists in the 1992 trail plan did not mandate an EIS under NEPA. NEPA does not require that an agency take into account every conceivable impact of its actions, including impacts on citizens' subjective experiences. Crowding cyclists onto fewer trails is not an environmental impact requiring an EIS.
[1]36 C.F.R. §§ 4.30, 7.97(c) (1995).
[2]16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
[3]36 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1995).
[4] Id. § 7.97(c).
[5]36 C.F.R. § 2.30 (1967 ed.), moved to 36 C.F.R. § 4.30 (July 1, 1977 ed.).
[6]16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
[7]Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
[8]463 U.S. 29 (1983).
[9]National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
[10]36 C.F.R. § 7.97(c) (1995).
[11]5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
