In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States Postal Service (Postal Service), dismissing the plaintiffs' claim that the Postal Service violated the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)[1] and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).[2] The court held that 1) the Postal Service did not violate the CZMA because the plaintiffs failed to show a compelling reason to overturn a consistency agreement between the Postal Service and Alaska; 2) the plaintiffs' attack on the substantive findings of the environmental assessment (EA) failed because the EA was sufficiently documented and explained; 3) the Postal Service adequately discussed mitigation strategies in the EA; and 4) given the objectives of the project, the Postal Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives in the EA.
In 1995, the Postal Service began plans to operate an experimental program for the delivery of mail by surface hovercraft to remote Alaskan villages on the Kuskokwim River. The initial scoping process identified several areas of concern, including potential effects on fish and wildlife, endangered species, and commercial fishing; however, the Postal Service prepared a draft EA that determined the hovercraft program would not have a significant impact on the environment, thereby precluding the need for an environmental impact statement (EIS). Although the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) disagreed with the draft EA's conclusion, the Postal Service issued a final EA and a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) in July 1997. The project commenced on July 14, 1997. The plaintiffs then filed an action in the District of Alaska alleging CZMA and NEPA violations and seeking an injunction to stop implementation of the program.
The plaintiffs first argued that the program violated the consistency provisions of the CZMA. Those provisions require federal development projects in a state's coastal zone to be consistent with applicable state coastal zone management programs to the "maximum extent practicable."[3] To implement these provisions, federal regulations require federal agencies to submit a consistency determination to the state at least ninety days prior to final approval of the project, unless the state and federal agencies agree to a different schedule.[4]
The Postal Service and the Alaska Division of Governmental Coordination agreed that if certain conditions were met, the hovercraft program was consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the applicable Alaska coastal zone management program. As a result, the court stated that without a "compelling reason" it would not set aside the agreement. The plaintiffs asserted three compelling reasons: the Postal Service 1) commenced the program prior to the ninety-day waiting period, 2) failed to comply with conditions outlined in Alaska's consistency determination, and 3) commenced the project before Alaska issued its final consistency determination.
The Ninth Circuit rejected all three arguments. First, the administrative record and evidence submitted by the Postal Service made it clear that Alaska and the Postal Service agreed to a different time frame than the ninety-day interval required by the regulations. Therefore, the failure to wait ninety days was not a compelling reason to interfere with the consistency agreement. The court next dismissed plaintiffs' contention that the Postal Service failed to comply with conditions outlined in Alaska's consistency determination. The Postal Service had submitted a draft monitoring plan to Alaska three days before beginning the project, thus satisfying conditions outlined in Alaska's consistency determination. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Postal Service could not have relied on Alaska's final consistency determination because the Postal Service commenced the program before receiving the determination. Because the Postal Service received a preliminary consistency determination from Alaska indicating the program was consistent with state law, the plaintiffs' argument was not compelling enough to overturn the consistency agreement.
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' NEPA claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the Postal Service's EA failed 1) to analyze adequately the environmental impacts of the hovercraft program, 2) to adequately explain mitigation measures, and 3) to consider an acceptable range of alternatives. Applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review,[5] the court stated it would only overturn the agency's conclusions in the EA if the plaintiffs demonstrated that the Postal Service failed to "articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions made."[6]
The court first rejected the plaintiffs' challenges to the substantive conclusions of the EA. The plaintiffs argued that language used in the EA indicated there was insufficient data concerning the impacts of the project. Examining the findings of the EA in its entirety, the court decided that while the EA acknowledged that impacts were possible, the documents did not "conclude that there were substantial questions whether those impacts would occur and be significant."[7] Therefore, the court determined that the EA was "sufficiently well-documented and explained."[8] In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the comments provided by FWS--that the project might provide a long-term disturbance of roosting waterfowl along the Kuskokwim River, significantly affecting nesting and migration patterns--demonstrated that the EA's conclusions were flawed. The court rejected this argument because the record provided sufficient grounds for the Postal Service's FONSI. Although NEPA requires the Postal Service to consider and address the initial concerns of FWS, the Postal Service is not required to defer to the conclusions of FWS. In short, the record was sufficient because the EA carefully analyzed the issues over which FWS expressed concern.
Next, the court discarded the plaintiffs' claim regarding the EA's lack of adequately explained mitigation measures. Stating the proposition that "NEPA does not require a fully developed plan detailing what steps will be taken to mitigate adverse environmental impacts,"[9] the court determined that the "generalized, non-self-executing mitigation strategies outlined in the [EA] are, therefore, not unreasonable in light of the fact that the mitigation plans are designed to ameliorate unexpected environmental impacts."[10] The record provided adequate support for the Postal Service's conclusion that the program would not have a significant impact on the environment, making preparation of an EIS unnecessary and NEPA regulations concerning mitigation strategies inapplicable.
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the EA fell short of the Postal Service's own regulations. The plaintiffs argued that the Postal Service's regulations require the agency to evaluate reasonable alternatives when recommended actions may have a significant effect on the environment.[11] In this case, the plaintiffs contended, the Postal Service failed to adequately consider the "no-action" alternative and failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives. The Ninth Circuit determined the Postal Service had adequately considered the "no-action" alternative because the EA's use of continued delivery by fixed-wing aircraft as the "no-action" alternative was not arbitrary or capricious, and baseline studies were unnecessary. Furthermore, the court concluded that the EA considered a reasonable range of alternatives in light of the program's objectives. Because the Postal Service implemented the program to improve mail delivery to remote Alaskan villages, the agency was not required to consider alternatives that would fail to achieve this objective. The court concluded that the EA's rejection of alternative transportation modes was reasonable because the inefficiency of alternative transportation modes led to implementation of the experimental program in the first place. Finally, although the Postal Service considered discontinuing hovercraft operations during subsistence bird-hunting season, its determination that the program's effects on waterfowl would be insignificant made it reasonable to reject this option.
