494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007)
Defendant National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) appealed the California District Court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff environmental groups on claims that the agency's finding that the use of purse-seine nets to harvest tuna did not have an adverse impact on Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) dolphin population recovery was arbitrary and capricious because the agency did not comply with Congress's directives for scientific studies.[1] The Ninth Circuit affirmed on each of the three independent grounds for which the district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment: 1) NMFS's predecessor, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), failed to conduct statutorily-mandated studies, 2) the best available scientific evidence did not support NOAA's "Final Finding," and 3) political concerns improperly influenced the Final Finding.[2] In 1997, Congress enacted the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act ( ). . ), the Secretary's finding was arbitrary and capricious because the evidence supporting the Secretary's decision was inconclusive. ), affirmed the district court's decision in Brower I because the agency had not reached a conclusive answer as required by the IDCPA . .[11] The Secretary appealed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same guidelines as the district . .[13] The Ninth Circuit first addressed the district court's holding that the agency failed to conduct statutorily mandated studies. The court noted that the IDCPA directed the Secretary to ascertain the purse-seine fishery's effect on ETP dolphins, while the amended dictated the methodology and data on which the agency should base its . ]." ."[16] Congress intended the necropsy study to determine if delayed or indirect effects of the fishery were killing dolphins. . NOAA studied... {Continue reading}
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
The State of Massachusetts, joined by various other States,[1] local governments[2] and organizations[3] (Petitioners), petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).[4] The agency denied the petition, contending that (1) the CAA does not authorize EPA to issue binding regulations dealing with global climate change, and (2) even if the CAA did give the agency the authority to set greenhouse gas emissions standards, it would decline to exercise that authority for a number of political and scientific reasons. In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that EPA properly exercised its discretion in denying the petition for rulemaking and dismissed the petitions. The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision, determining: (1) Petitioners had standing to challenge EPA's denial of their petition to regulate green house gas emissions from new motor vehicles under the CAA, (2) EPA has the authority to regulate green house gas emissions from new motor vehicles under the CAA, and (3) should EPA decline to exercise that authority, its reasons must be grounded in the statute. Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA mandates that EPA set standards for emissions of air pollutants from motor vehicles where those pollutants "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."[5] The CAA's definition of "welfare" includes effects on the climate.[6] In response to growing scientific evidence concerning the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on the climate and inaction on the part of the Federal Government to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases, a group of organizations filed... {Continue reading}
No. 03-36032, 2007 WL 315338 (9th Cir. 2007)
Alaska landowners (the Hales) sued for an injunction to compel the National Park Service (NPS) to allow bulldozer access, via a government road, to their inholding within the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve (Park). The Hales argued the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) [1] provided them with access rights not subject to analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). [2] The district court denied the injunction and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no "final agency action" to review. [3] The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and the particular permit request was subject to NEPA analysis because ANILCA stipulates that access rights are "subject to reasonable regulations issued by the Secretary to protect . . . natural and other values. . . ." [4] Petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied. The Hales accessed their property via a poorly maintained 13 mile stretch of road. After a house on the property burned down in 2003, the Hales used a bulldozer to haul in rebuilding supplies until NPS posted a public notice prohibiting most motorized vehicles. The Hales submitted an "emergency" application for a temporary permit, seeking to transport supplies before the winter freeze. NPS notified the Hales that an environmental assessment (EA) would be required by NEPA, and offered to prepare the EA for them free of charge. The Hales did not supply NPS with the information it requested to the conduct the EA, instead opting to file suit seeking an injunction forcing NPS to provide feasible access to their property. In their suit, the Hales also sought declaratory judgments that NPS was violating their right-of-way over the... {Continue reading}
No. 05-15585, 2007 WL 2410135 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2007)
The Access Fund, a rock climbing advocacy group, appealed a decision of the District Court for the District of Nevada upholding the United States Forest Service's (USFS) ban on rock climbing at Cave Rock. Cave Rock is a large rock formation on Lake Tahoe's southeastern shore, located partially within a National Forest. In 1999, USFS banned rock climbing as part of a new management plan to protect the site's cultural and historic resources. The Access Fund sued in federal district court, asserting that 1) the USFS climbing ban violated the Constitution's Establishment Clause[1] and 2) USFS's action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[2] On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected both assertions and ruled in favor of USFS.[3] On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo, interpreting facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.[4] Under the APA, the Ninth Circuit could only set aside USFS's decision to ban climbing at Cave Rock if the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.[5] The Washoe people are Native Americans who have lived in the Lake Tahoe region for more than 1500 years. To the Washoe Tribe, Cave Rock is a sacred religious site and a symbol of the Tribe's cultural identity. The Washoe view their well-being as tied to the integrity of Cave Rock, and traditional Washoe assert that the mere presence of persons other than Washoe practitioners at the rock "endanger[s] the lives of all."[6] The site also has historic and archeological significance, arising in part because many Washoe doctors visited the site. Further, as a travel corridor... {Continue reading}
2007 WL 247236 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2007)
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) (the Governments) appealed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California in an action brought against Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company and Southern Pacific Transportation Company (the Railroads), and Shell Oil Company (Shell). The Governments sought to hold the Railroads and Shell liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) class=MsoEndnoteReference>[1] for the cost of investigation and clean up of hazardous substances at a now defunct agricultural chemical storage and distribution facility in Arvin, California. The Railroads owned land on which a portion of the facility operated; Shell supplied and delivered some of the chemicals used at the facility. class=MsoEndnoteReference>[2] Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B & B), the facility owner and operator, was no longer operational at the time of this action. Seeking to impose liability on other potentially responsible parties (PRPs) for removal of threats to groundwater from chemical contamination, EPA and DTSC each filed CERCLA actions against B & B, the Railroads, and Shell. The Railroads, in turn, sued B & B for contribution, to recover costs incurred in the cleanup. class=MsoEndnoteReference>[3] The district court consolidated the three cases, finding the Railroads liable as owners of the facility at the time of hazardous waste disposal[4] and finding Shell liable as a “person” who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances.[5] Because it found the harm was capable of apportionment, however, the district court limited... {Continue reading}
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