Eight environmental groups and several individuals (collectively "Biodiversity Legal Foundation")[1] appealed a district court decision[2] that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has discretion under section 4 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)[3] to make initial findings beyond the twelve-month deadline imposed for final listing determinations under the ESA.[4] The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "the only way to interpret [section 4](b)(3)(A)[5] in harmony with [section 4](b)(3)(B)[6] is by limiting the [FWS's] discretion" under the former subsection by the deadline imposed in the latter.[7] FWS cross-appealed the district court's denial of its request for additional time to make final determinations. The district court had based its decision on a lack of equitable discretion to refrain from issuing injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision, holding that the "ESA forecloses the exercise of discretion when the agency misses ESA-imposed deadlines."[8]
In February 1995, Biodiversity Legal Foundation (BLF) filed a petition to list the Spalding's Catchfly as an endangered species. When BLF initiated suit in 1999,[9] FWS had yet to make an initial determination. In July 1995, BLF filed a petition to list the southern California population segment of the Mountain Yellow Legged Frog as an endangered or threatened species; by 1999 FWS had yet to make a final determination. In 1997, BLF petitioned to list the Great Basin Redband Trout as an endangered or threatened species; by 1999 FWS had yet to make a final determination. In 1998, BLF petitioned to list the Yellow Billed Cuckoo as endangered; by 1999 FWS had yet to act on the petition.
The Ninth Circuit began its decision with an overview of the ESA's framework, relying on Oregon Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Kantor[10] to note that while FWS has discretion to extend initial determinations beyond ninety days, FWS must make a final determination within twelve months of receiving the listing petition. The court then considered FWS's allegations that BLF lacked standing and that BLF's claims were moot because FWS had made final decisions to list the species at issue. With respect to standing, the court held that BLF's "desire to use, observe, and study the stated plant and animal species is undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing," [11] and BLF faces "specific and concrete" injury because FWS's failure to list the species at issue would "result in continued threats to their existence."[12] The court also recognized that BLF had standing to challenge the general pattern of delay under the listing program and determined that the Declaratory Judgment Act[13] gave the district court authority to grant declaratory relief because of the controversy concerning the proper interpretation the ESA's listing timeline and the number of analogous suits pending in other federal courts. With respect to mootness, the Ninth Circuit again rejected FWS's claims, reiterating that BLF sought two remedies: to compel FWS to make the listing determinations and to declare that section 4 requires FWS to make final determinations within twelve months of receiving a petition. In response to the district court order, FWS completed the listing decisions. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that FWS's interpretation of the ESA allowed the agency to "delay action indefinitely."[14]
The court then addressed BLF's claims. It rejected FWS's interpretation of the section 4 provisions as contrary to clear congressional intent to shorten the process for listing species. According to FWS, the 90-day time limit in section 4(b)(3)(A) is independent of the one-year time limit in section 4(b)(3)(B), and if the agency decides that an initial determination is impracticable, the agency may delay making a listing decision indefinitely. The court decided that such an interpretation would render section 4(b)(3)(B) inoperative, and the only way to give effect to both subsections of the ESA is to apply the one-year deadline to both the initial and final determinations. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit decided that Congress intended to limit the flexibility of initial determination deadlines by imposing firm deadlines for final determinations.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned to FWS's allegations on cross-appeal, namely that the district court erred in determining that it had no discretion with respect to enjoining FWS to meet its statutory deadlines. FWS also argued that the court should consider FWS priorities when deciding whether the agency's action was "unlawfully withheld" or "unreasonably delayed."[15] The district court had relied on the holdings in Forest Guardians v. Babbitt[16] to decide that when the agency fails to comply with a nondiscretionary statutory deadline, the agency has unlawfully withheld action and the Administrative Procedure Act[17] requires the court to issue an injunction. In deciding whether the district court erred in granting the injunction, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision for abuse of discretion[18] while reviewing the legal rulings on which the district court relied de novo.[19] Although a statutory violation does not automatically lead to an injunction, the "test for determining if equitable relief is appropriate is whether an injunction is necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose behind the statute."[20] Because Congress had already balanced the equities "in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities,"[21] the court had no discretion to consider FWS priorities before issuing the injunction.
[1] Appellants were Biodiversity Legal Foundation, Montana Native Plant Society-Flathead Chapter, Washington Native Plant Society-Northeast Chapter, Peter Lesica from the Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, Bonnie Dombrowski from the Maricopa Audubon Society, Huachuca Audubon Society, Utah Environmental Congress, Oregon Natural Desert Association, Oregon Trout, Native Fish Society, and Oregon Chapter of Trout Unlimited.
[2] Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, No. CIV 98-1093-KI, 1999 WL 1042567 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 1999).
[5] Section 4(b)(3)(A) states in part that "[t]o the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days after receiving the petition of an interested person" to list a species under the ESA, the Secretary "shall make a finding as to whether the petition presents substantial . . . information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted." 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(3)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The court refers to this provision as an "initial finding or determination." Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley (Biodiversity Legal Found. II), 284 F.3d 1046, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002).
[6] Section 4(b)(3)(B) states in part that "[w]ithin 12 months after receiving a petition that is found under [§4(b)(2)(A)] to present substantial information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted, the Secretary shall" find that the petitioned action is either unwarranted, warranted, or warranted but precluded. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(3)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). The court refers to this provision as a "final determination." Biodiversity Legal Found. II, 281 F.3d at 1051 n.4.
[11] Biodiversity Legal Found. II, 284 F.3d at 1052-53 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992)).
