Two environmental groups, Friends of the Yosemite Valley and Mariposans for Environmentally Friendly Growth (collectively environmental groups), sued the National Park Service (NPS) for alleged deficiencies in the creation of the Merced River Wild and Scenic Comprehensive Management Plan (CMP). After a denial of declaratory and injunctive relief, the environmental groups appealed on the grounds that the Merced CMP violated the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA),[1] and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).[2]

Under the WSRA, designated river segments are governed by conservation measures to protect their natural condition. Upon listing, WSRA requires the administering agency to establish detailed boundaries around the protected river and prepare a CMP within three years.[3] The WSRA further sets out elements that a CMP must cover, such as "resource protection, development of lands and facilities, user capacities, and other management practices necessary."[4] The statute also mandates that the administering agency "cooperate with . . . the Environmental Protection Agency and . . . state water pollution control agencies."[5]

In 1987 Congress designated portions of the Merced River as a Wild and Scenic River Segment (WSRS). Responding to a court order in Sierra Club v. Babbitt,[6] NPS issued the Merced CMP in November of 2000. The environmental groups claimed the CMP violated the prior district court's ruling, WSRA, NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),[7] and alleged that NPS failed to cooperate with the applicable water pollution control agencies. The district court rejected all of the environmental groups' claims.[8]

On appeal, the environmental groups asserted four separate deficiencies in the Merced CMP. First, the environmental groups alleged the CMP failed to adequately address "user capacity," a required element of a plan under the WSRA. Second, they claimed that the boundaries set around the El Portal section of the river failed to ensure protection of the wild and scenic characteristics of the river. Third, they claimed that the programmatic nature of the CMP, which incorporated a final environmental impact statement (EIS), violated the WSRA, the regulations implementing the WSRA, and NEPA because it did not allow for the incorporation of sufficiently specific data. Finally, the environmental groups alleged that NPS had failed to meet the WSRA's mandate of cooperation with federal and state water pollution control agencies to prevent pollution of the river. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court on the issues of user capacity and the El Portal boundaries, but affirmed the district court's holdings on the sufficiency of both the data within the CMP and the NPS's cooperation with other water pollution control agencies.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. The court reviewed NPS's actions under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard.[9] The court first addressed the question of whether the CMP adequately addressed the issue of user capacity. NPS asserted the Visitor Experience and Resource Protection (VERP) section of the Merced CMP adequately addressed user capacity by setting desired standards for river conditions over a five-year period. The Ninth Circuit held NPS's VERP approach invalid because it failed to establish any specific numerical measurement of the number of visitors the area could sustain while maintaining the river's inherent characteristics. Looking at the plain meaning of "user capacity," the court held that the statute required an administering agency to address maximum visitor capacity in the CMP.

The court saw further support for this interpretation in the 1982 guidelines published by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior.[10] The court read these guidelines as requiring a CMP to include explicit, quantifiable limits on use. The VERP method failed to deal or discuss the visitor capacity of the Merced section because it relied on monitoring environmental impact. Thus, NPS would take action only where it appeared the desired standards were not being met, rather than making an overall capacity determination. The court then remanded this issue to NPS with instructions to adopt specific limits on use.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected the WSRA boundaries NPS had set for an area along the Merced River and within Yosemite National Park's administrative area, known as El Portal. Drawing on Eighth Circuit case law,[11] the Ninth Circuit held that the WSRA boundaries must protect and enhance the outstandingly remarkable values (ORVs) which had caused the river to be listed. The El Portal boundaries violated this statutory mandate because they were drawn too narrowly, excluding specific ORVs. Thus, the court remanded to NPS with instructions to redraw the El Portal boundaries to include the specific ORVs within the WSRS.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the CMP and EIS contained sufficient data to comply with both the WSRA and NEPA. The Ninth Circuit first considered the WSRA standard for data incorporated into a CMP. WSRA mandates merely that the CMP be comprehensive.[12] The Ninth Circuit found that "the three-volume CMP, purportedly based upon 'the best data available . . . [and] including nearly 100 years of study' . . . falls well within the ordinary meaning of comprehensive."[13]

The Ninth Circuit then analyzed the CMP under NEPA. The court distinguished two levels of administrative action: 1) the programmatic stage, where the agency is developing alternative management scenarios for larger areas, and 2) the implementation stage, where an agency is dealing with individual projects.[14] NEPA requires a full analysis of site specific impacts only when the agency has reached the implementation stage, where concrete proposals have been made.[15] The court reasoned that the CMP fit within the programmatic stage because it merely laid out broad guidelines for future actions taken within the designated corridor. Thus, since the CMP was just a guidance document, the court held that NPS had not abused its discretion because there were sufficiently specific data in the CMP's EIS.

To address the environmental groups' allegation that NPS failed to cooperate with other water pollution control agencies as mandated by section 1283 of the WSRA, the Ninth Circuit first dealt with its jurisdiction over the claim. NPS argued on appeal that the Clean Water Act (CWA),[16] specifically the sixty day notice requirement, preempted the plaintiffs' claims under section 1283 of the WSRA. The court concluded jurisdiction was proper because the statutory provisions had two different, coexisting goals. The CWA citizen suit provisions were aimed at bringing statutory violations to the attention of the agency and giving the agency a chance to remedy the situation.[17] In contrast, the environmental groups' allegation of failure to cooperate with appropriate water pollution control agencies addressed the NPS's failure to avoid violations. The court determined that the difference in these goals ensured that the notice requirements of the CWA were not frustrated by the environmental groups' section 1283 claim. NPS also asserted that jurisdiction was not proper because there was no final agency action to review. The Ninth Circuit held that NPS had waived this objection because it was not raised before the district court.

The Ninth Circuit went on to find that NPS did not violate its statutory mandate to cooperate with water pollution control agencies. The environmental groups argued that the Ninth Circuit's determination that this question involved a finding of fact on the part of the district court, not the application of a legal standard, was central to this ruling. Thus, the district court's determination was reviewed for clear error. The district court had found the NPS's performance, while not stellar, did not constitute "such an abysmal level" as to be categorized as not cooperating with the water pollution agencies.[18] The Ninth Circuit decided this conclusion was supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case tothe district court to enter the necessary orders requiring NPS to correct the deficiencies in both the user capacity of the CMP and the WSRS boundaries at the El Portal site.